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Foucault, Power, Left Politics 
GARY  WICKHAM 
Foucault  is  useful.  For  those  of  us  who  are  interested  in 
understanding and contributing to  at least some of the objectives 
often  aggregated  under  the  heading  'Left  politics  in  Australia', 
we  can gain a great deal from  some of Ithe  work of  this  increas-
ingly influential French thinker. 
But we must be careful. In Australian political analysis, it seems 
to me, the work of Foucault has taken on the status of a magical 
elixir.  There are those who  scorn its advertised benefits  claiming 
they have always gotten by without it. There are those who drink it 
freely and regard it "as  genuinely magical,  able to provide a ready 
cure for all the ills  of  political analysis.  And there are those who 
are tempted to try it and who,  when they have had no more than 
a sip,  quickly adopt one or other of the above positions. 
In this  essay  I  aim  to  avoid  treating Foucault's  work  as  such 
an elixir. I intend to present a brief reading of some of Foucault's 
work on power,  and to use  this  reading  as  the basis for  formu-
lating  an  alternative  mode  of  political  analysis  and in  tum for 
introducing  some  arguments  about  Left  politics  in  Australia.  I 
will  use Foucault rather than being for or against Foucault. This 
goes some way down the path recently suggested by Bob Connel}! 
- to  examine  the  relevance  of  marxism  vis  a vis  'difference 
theory',  including the work of Foucault. 
Connell  argues  that  Australian  political  analysis  must  focus 
on present Australian political situations  and should employ  any 
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theory  can  and  should  be used  alongside  some  of  the ideas  of 
Australian marxists and some of those of the 'libertarian socialists 
and  cultural radicals'.  He warns against caricaturing ideas,  stress-
ing  that we  should be always  on the look-out for 'what is  useful, 
helpful,  admirable  and  worth building on'.2  He sums  up: 
...  the  literature  of  'difference'  may be  a  fruitful  and enriching  one, 
diversifying  and  complicating  our  view  of  this  world.  Taken  as  a 
slogan  and  erected  into  a  strategic  guideline,  its  effects  are  likely  to 
be  the  reverse:  it  can become  a  code-word for separation and mutual 
indifference:  for refusal of the hard questions, of the complexities and 
frustrations  of  mass  politics,  coalitions,  mutual  learning  and  trans-
formation.3 
~1y introduotory reading of some of Foucault's ideas on power 
will  involve both points of explication and critique. On this basis, 
in  the  second section I  will  argue that ithe  notion of power. itself 
is  not  worth  retaining,  that political  analysis  is  best undertaken 
without it,  and that thereby an alternative mode of political analy-
sis  can  be presentedl  In ithe  third and final  section I  will  attempt 
to  define  Left  politics  in  Australia  and  discuss  the  ramification 
for  it  of  replacing existing modes  of  analysis  with the alternative 
mode informed by my critical reading of Foucault. I will conclude 
by  expressing  a  few  doubts  about the role  of  political  analysis, 
including  the  role  of  this  essay. 
1.  Foucault  and  Power 
The  most  convenient  first  step  is  to present  some  propositions 
from Foucault about what power is not. Power is not a possession, 
it  is  not  something  which  is  owned  or· exercised  by  a  class,  a 
group  or an  individual.s Power is  not a process of the subjugation 
of independently existing individuals.6  Power is not simply the act 
1.  Bob  Connell,  'Marxists  and  Anti-Marxists:  Reflections  on  Similarity 
and Difference',  Intervention  18,  n.d. 
2.  Ibid.,  pp. 79,  80. 
3.  Ibid.,  pp. 82-3. 
4.  This  section  is  based  mainly  on  my  'Power  and  Power  Analysis: 
Beyond  Foucault?"  Economy  and Society  12,  4,  1983.  Any material 
in  the  section not sourced in this Economy and Society article will be 
acknowledged  separately  and/or will be contained in footnotes. 
5.  Michel  Foucault,  'Power  and  Norm:  Notes',  in  M.  Morris  and  P. 
Patton eds,  Michel Foucault:  Power,  Truth,  Strategy,  Sydney,  Ferral 
Publications,  1979,  p. 59. 
6.  Foucault, 'Power and Strategies', in C. Gordon ed., Power-Knowledge: 
Michel  Foucault,  New York,  Pantheon Books,  1980, p.140. 
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prohibitions of a Monarch, or a State, or the Law, or the General 
"Vill.7  Power is  not monolithic or one-sided, it is  not 'controlled' 
from 'one point of view'.8 
The second step is to present some propositions from Foucault 
c!.bout what power is.  Power is  'co-extensive with the social body', 
it is  a  set of relations which  are 'interwoven with  other kinds  of 
relations'. It 'starts' in the  'smallest elements of the social body' 
(fal11Jly,  sexual rela,tions, neighbourhoods)  and 'works its  way up'. 
He stresses that power must be studied 'from the bottom up'. To 
help in this  endeavour he uses  the notion of technologies,  mech-
anisms for the specific operation of power. Simple examples might 
be the clock and its role in power relations in the workplace, and 
the contraceptIve pill and ~ts role in power relations in homes and 
in medicine.  Foucault concentrates though on the more complex 
eXaluple  of  disciplinary  technology.  This  technology  is,  for  him, 
the dominant technology of power in the modern era. It is  a tech-
nology  by which  many  are  controlled  by few.  His  exemplar is 
Benthmn's Panopticon, an ideal prison in which a limited number 
of guards in a central tower watch and control a large number of 
prisoners. This principle he suggests is now in use in contemporary 
institutions  such  as  schools  and factories. 
vVe  saw above that Foucault rejeots  the 'idea that power works 
on independently existing  individuals.  As Martin puts  it:  'Power 
does not just happen to people, people happen to it.'9 For Foucault 
the subjects of power arc formed in power relations. He sometimes 
refers  to  these  subjects  of power by the term 'bodies'.  He says 
'bodies are produced in power'.10 Equally he says  that resistance, 
7.  Foucault,  'The Eye  of Power',  in ibid.,  p. 158. 
8.  Foucault, 'Power  and Norm:  Notes',  op. cit.,  p. 60. 
9.  Bill Martin, 'Foucault: Power/Counter-Power', Arena 73,  1985, p.  140. 
Foucault  does  not  deny  the  existence  and  operation  of  individuals, 
only that individuals  are the natural and sole  focus  of power. 
10.  In  an  interview  given  not  long  before  his  death  (and  after  the 
publication in France of the second and third volumes  of the  history 
6llf  sexuality project)  Foucault suggests  a  further  arm to his  ideas  on 
subjects of power when he advances some propositions about 'the self'. 
Here, the idea of individuals as entities which pre-exist power relations 
seems  to  be  somewhat  resuscitated  as  Foucault discusses  'techniques 
of  governing  the  self'  which  are  adopted  by  individuals  and  which 
form the basis of sexuality (Foucault, 'The Regard for Truth', preface 
by Paul Patton, Art and Text 16,  1984). Faced with suggestions  like 
these  fr.m  Foucault  we  can  do  one  of two  things.  We  can  dump 
everything  Foucault  has  previously  said  about  subjects  and  return 
easily. to the notion of individuals  as  unproblematic  foci  of  political 
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pewer,  'counter-power'.  'Vhile Foucault tells  us  that power 'may 
control resistance - resistance is  the 'counter-stroke' to power-
lvic:.rtin  stresses  that  this  does  110t  mean  we  can  find  a  single 
origin  .of  resistance,  of 'counter-power',  and then build a  politics 
oE  rcs:stance  around it.  He says  that just as  power for Foucault 
does  not  'emanate  from  a  sovereign,  a  state,  or a  ruling  class', 
so  resistances,  'counter-powers',  'do not fit  ,this  framework')1 
The  third  step  in our summary  is  to  present  some  points  of 
criticism/  development. The major problem with Foucault's under-
standing  of power is  the  way  the concept Itakes  on a  life  of  its 
own.  It is  widely  acknowledged,  (FoucauH  acknowledges  this 
himself)  that his  project is  aimed  at  allowing power analysis  to 
consider  objects  Eke  sexuality  and  pris~ms  in  their  own  right. 
Tbese have tended to be ignored or marginalized by various forms 
of  marxist analysis  wbich concentrate,  either immediately or ulti-
mately,  on objects  c,entral  to  economic production.  This for  me 
is  a  laudable  and cnlcial  aim.  But I  cannot  see  how Foucault's 
conception  of  power can help achieve it.  We  are being asked to 
rep19.ce  analyses  which  eventually  end  up  at  the  Economy  or 
the  St(]te  with  analyses  which  eventually  end  up  at  Power  or 
Discipline.  This  does  not seem  a  particularly useful move if we 
want pmver analysis t0' address objects in their own right. In other 
words  it  is  the necessary  'ending up' which  is  the  real problem, 
not  the ending up at the economy or the state,  as  Foucault se0ms 
to  be  saying. 
One way  in which we can readily develop Foucault's insights in 
relation  to  the location  of  povver  is  Ito  concentrate on particular 
sites  of  power relations rather than on their supposed aggregation 
or  climax in a  society or state.  I  do not want to place too much 
weight on the concept of sites, for if it is given too much to carry 
it will become effectively the same thing as  what is  often currently 
understood  as  society or the state.  We might loosely define a site 
as  an  intersection of  particular objectives  (with the forces  trying 
to  achieve  them), but a definition, or this particular term itself, is 
action. Or,  alternatively, we can concentrate on the 'techniques' aspect 
of  his  formulation,  assume  that  individuals  are  a  separate  set  of 
techniques from those of the self, not pre-existing entities, and continue 
our  reworking  of Left politics  to which the problematization  of the 
notion  of pre-existing individuals  is  central.  Hopefully my arguments 
in  this  essay will  demonstrate the  wisdom of the latter choice. 
11.  Martin,  op.  cit.,  pp. 144.  147" 
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constructing the object of any  analysis. 
Power  analysis  should be about  analysing  the  way  particular 
objectives  are operating  (crudely, whether they are succeeding or 
failing,  in their own terms  and in relation to other objectives)  in 
particular places or sites at particular moments  (analysis must be 
an ongoing process). It has  to be stressed at this  point that this 
call for a concentration on particular objectives in particular sites 
does  not mean a call for  a  concentration on small objectives in 
small sites.  It is  an attempt to avoid the problems of the general, 
assumed to be general or interconnected through the operation of 
some mySlterious,  automatic principles of aggregation. It is  not an 
attempt to avoid the big  or the global.  It is  a call for  a concen-
tration  on  specific. objectives  in specific  sites - objectives  with 
definite conditions  of  operrution.  In this  way  control of the world 
economy  can be  a  specific  objective,  with  definite  conditions  of 
operation  in  procedures  of  the  World  Bank,  the  International 
Monetary Fund, the United Nations, a range of inter-nation trading 
agreements,  and so  on,  just  as  control of  a  classroom  can be a 
a  specific  objective,  with  definite  conditions  of  operation  in  the 
use  of  certain  pedagogic  techniques,  implemenJtation  of  certain 
rules  of  classroom  behaviour,  and  limiting  decisions  about  cur-
riculum design. 
In  relation  to  the  production  or  constitution  of  subjects  in 
power we  need  firstly  to make use  of  one  of  Foucault's  inter-
ventions  against  certain modes  of  writing  his,tory,  to reformulate 
!the idea of the  production or constitution of subjects.  This inter-
vention is  in opposition to the dominance of  the concept of origin 
in much  history  writing  and  thus  is  in opposition  to the search 
for  origins.  Rather than going  into detail here we  need  only  to 
note that these  arguments  add up to the position that as  we  can 
only ever know the past as  constructs in the present,  any  search 
for origins  has  to be fruitless,12  We can establish lines  of forma-
tion  for  any  object,  establish  a  genealogy  for  it,  shed  light  on 
'clues'  about  it,  as  Donzelot  puts  it,13  but only  in the  present, 
only - in  Donzelot's  words  again - in  the  present  tense.  We 
cannot seriously  grant the sltatus  of origin  to what must be part 
of a contemporary construction  (which we might see as  continual 
12.  Probably the  best  account to  appear so  far  on Foucault's  arguments 
against the notion of origins is Mark Poster's Marxism,  Foucault and 
History,  Cambridge,  Polity,  1984,  ch.3. 
13.  Jacques  Donzelot,  'The  Poverty  of  Political  Culture',  Ideology  and 
Consciousness  5,  1979,  pp.78-9. 
150  Arena 78,  1987 
-reconstruction)  process.  Foucault  suggests,  though  he  never 
directly  acknowledges  this,  that  we  are  better  to  think  of  the 
objects  of  any  investigation in  a way' made popular by Althusser, 
as  always-already  exiSJting.  So  in  short we  cannot readily  accept 
the  ~dca of the production or constitution of  our object of investi-
gation - the subjects  of power. We  are better off  considering the 
opera/ion  of  subjects  rClither  than their production or constitution. 
Having  done  this  we  can move  on  to make  another reformu-
lation  of  Foucault's treatment of the subjects of power.  We need 
to  put  more  emphasis  on  the  different  ways  in  which  different 
specific  forms  of· subjects  operate· in  different  specific  sites,  and 
less  emphasis on the operation of subjects in relation to Power ·or 
Discipline.  This formulation of Foucault's is both too general and 
too  negative.  It is  too general in that it suggests that all subjects 
operate in  the  same way and it is  too negative in that it suggests, 
despite  his  own  warnings  that  theories  of  the subject  should not 
do  so,  that  all  subjects  operate in sUbjeotion - they  are subjects 
of Power or Discipline, whether they are controllers or controlled. 
An  example of the way we  might see the operation of subjects 
in  difference is  the operation of different specific subject-forms in 
Australian  schools.  Within  schools  we  have the operation of the 
subject-form  'child' in ways  similar to  those in which it operates 
in other sites, like-families, government agencies and medical insti-
tutions.  The  child· has  no  necessary  biological  or psychological 
status - whether it is  a  'real, breathing, feeling  human being'  is 
not  relevant.  The 'child is  a  construct of knowledges  which  often 
overlap:  in  families,  knowledges  about what stage the child is  at, 
about  what  the child needs;  ingoverntnentagencies, knowledges 
about  paying  the  parent  welfare  payments  for  the  child,  about 
regulations  to pl'event  the child from undertaking most forms  of 
paid  employment;  in  medical  institutions,  knowledges  about  the 
'special'  illnesses which the child might suffer,  about the need for 
special  treatment  facilities  required  to  treat the  child.14  In other 
words  the  child  is  a specific  subject-form which operates via the 
use  of  certain  techniques  of  knowledge.  In schools  this  specific 
subject-fom1  operates  via  techniques  of  knowledge  such  as  those 
c·oncerned  with  developmental  stages,  but it  is  also  transformed 
through  pedagogic  and administrative techniques like segregating, 
testing  and  keeping  records  on  pupils  into. other specific  subject-
14.  An  excellent  account  of.  the ·way  know  ledges  of the  child  operate  is 
.. provided by Donzelot's The Policing of Families, New York, Pantheon, 
1979. 
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pupil or co-operative pupil. 
The  operation  of  subjects  in  difference  might  also  involve 
the transformation of non-person subject-forms. The subject-form 
'family business', operating via techniques of knowledge concerned 
with running a small business, might be transformed via techniques 
of  knowledge  concerned  with  expanding  businesses,  especially 
certain  legal  techniques,  into  the  subject-form  'limited  liability 
company'  .15 
A  further  step  involves  questioning  Foucault's  treatment  of 
resistance  or  opposition.  If resistance  is  controlled by  power,  it 
is  not really resistance at all,  resistance cannot exist.  Add to this 
the problem of  seeing  resistance  in  a  general  way,  of  the  same 
form,  in all places,  and we  obviously are in need of  a further re-
formulation. It  is better not to seek any general form for resistance, 
but to examine the way objectives come into opposition with each 
other  and/or with  the  objective  (or  objectives)  which  has  (or 
have)  achieved a dominance in a paI1ticular site (or perhaps with 
the way they do not come into opposition). For example we can 
analyse the way the objective of improving the pay and conditions 
of untenured university staff  comes  into opposition  with  the  ob-
jective of universities  retaining flexibility  in their staffing policies, 
without the need to resort to a general theory of  resistance.  And 
we can do the same when we are analysing the way the objective of 
shifting the burden of taxation away from low- and middle-income 
earners comes into opposition with the objective of maintaining a 
high level of profitability for multi-national corporations in Aust-
ralia. As long as  the sites and objectives involved are seen in their 
specificity we  run into little difficulty  and we keep our analysis  at 
the level of the conditions of operation of power. We will see in the 
third section what this argument means for the idea of Left politics 
or socialist politics. 
15.  Note that I  am using the term 'subject-form' instead of 'subject'. While 
I  do  think  it is  a  more  useful  way  of  discussing  the  details  of  the 
processes  of subject  operation, I  am  fully  aware  that it leaves  many 
of  the  problems  of  definition  (such  as  differences  between  person, 
type  of  person  and  non-person  forms,  relationship  to  objectives 
involved  in  sites)  unresolved.  Many  people  working  in  this  area 
(including  me)  have  tried,  among  others,  the  terms  'agent',  'actor', 
and  'force'  to  try  to  overcome  these  problems,  but  with  little  reat 
success. It  seems  now  that the best thing to do  is  to opt for  one  term 
or another,  acknowledge  the  difficulties,  and proceed. 
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I argued  above  that the main problem with Foucault's treatment 
of power is  the way  the concept takes on a life of its  own.  I now 
want to  extend this argument to show ,that this problem is  a prob-
lem  with  the  concept itself  not just  with Foucault's treatment of 
it 
There  are two  closely  related  aspects  to  the problem with  the 
concept  of  power  itself - one involves  its ontological status  and 
the other involves  its  singular staltus.  When I say that power takes 
on  a life  of  its  own in Foucault's hands, I am saying that it takes 
on  an  ontological status of  its  own - it becomes its  own reality. 
But Foucault should not be singled out here; he is  doing no more 
than following  a long tradition in understanding power  as  a  real 
entity,  something which can be known in itself.  This  tradition is 
particularly  strong  within  most  modes  of  political  analysis,  cer-
tainly  those predominantly British-style marxist and liberal modes 
used in Australia.16 
The major ramification for political analysis  and the consequent 
political  actions  of  this  aspect of the problem with power is  that 
analysts  end  up  spending  a  lot  of unproductive  time  trying  to 
know  power itself.  It is  an  especially widespread instance of  the 
problem  of  essentialism  criticized  earlier.  While  some  marxist 
modes  of  political  analysis  can  and· should  be criticized for un-
necessarily  imposing  an  essence  like  the Economy,  the  State  or 
the  Class  Struggle  on  specific  objects  of  analysis,  while  liberal 
modes  should be criticized for imposing an  essence like the Indi-
vidual,  and  while  Foucault  should be criticized  for· imposing  an 
essence  like Discipline, Foucault should not be the only one criti-
cized  for  imposing  power  as  an  essence.  We  may  well  say  thaJt 
power too readily becomes Power in his hands, but we should not 
say  it  at  the  cost of realizing that this  must happen  in anyone's 
hands,  given  that  the  concept  currently  has  this  status  in  most 
sites  of  political  analysis;  power  in  effect  is  always  being  spelt 
with  a capital P. 
Of  course  I  am  touching  on  a  much  larger  problem  here, 
16.  Consider Steven Lukes's book Power:  A  Radical View  (Oxford, OUP, 
1974,  esp.  Chs.  1,  2  and 3) which has been quite influential in  Aust-
ralia  and  which  addresses  itself to  both marxist and liberal modes  of 
political  analysis.  Lukes  sets up his  entire book in  terms  of views  of 
power  with  dimensions,  on  the  assumption  that  power  is  something 
that  is  so  real it can  be  seen,  at least in theoretical terms. 
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Power in itself, like attempts to know the State or the Individual, 
might best be seen as  inspired by, or even  as  the remnants of,  the 
Enlightenment project. This project, which envelops much Western 
science, suggests that grand meta-knowledge is  possible and more-
over that it is the key to grand social and political reforms.  While 
it would be fair to say that much of this essay is an encouragement 
to abandon this project and its remnants as futile and unproductive, 
for  other less  ambitious  political projects  with  clearer  and  more 
achievable objectives,  all  I  intend to do here is  acknowledge the 
influence  on  my  thinking  of  the  debate  currently  taking  place 
between  Habermas,  arguing  for  the  retention  of  a  sophisticated 
version of the Enlightenment thesis,  and Lyotard, arguing that this 
is  not possible.17 
The other aspect of the problem with power itself - its singular 
status - means that not only is  power being investigated as  a real 
entity  but  also  that it  is  being  investigated  as  the  one  and  only 
entity  ultimately worth investigating.  All sites  of  politics  and the 
different  objectives  alld  forces  involved  are  brought  under  the 
umbrella of  the one great concept. 
The singular status backs up the ontological one.  A  futile  and 
counter-productive project becomes  even  more so.  Why  not  just 
stick with the concept of  politics and forget about power. Perhaps 
it too will  eventually fall  victim to the Enlightenment euphoria in 
sites  of  political  analysis  and political action in the same way  as 
has  power.  But for  the  time being  at least  politics  is  a  concept 
which allows the investigation of the operation of different object-
ives  and different forces,  in particular sites,  without opening up a 
grand umbrella to unify them. At the moment politics is  a concept 
which lends  itself far more readily than power to the analysis  of 
and within  different  sites  without it becoming  an  umbrella.  We 
can have  the  politics  of  prisons. in  its  own  right,  we  can  have 
the politics  of  child-care in its  own right.  Nothing is  lost, .in  fact 
a lot is  gained. 
We  head into  the next section  then,  armed with  an  argument 
that political  analysis  like  the political  actions  it  enforces  is  not 
a single  enterprise. It (and obviously I  can do  no more  than use 
the figure  'it' in this essay for purposes of theoretical discussion -
a  point  to  which  I  shall  return  in  my  concluding  remarks)  is 
17.  See  especially  Jiirgen  Habermas,  'Modernity  Versus  Postmodernity'. 
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Modern  Condition,  Manchester,  Manchester  University  Press,  1984. 
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with  different  forces  intersecting at what I  call  sites  at particular 
mcments.  These ways  of  assessing mayor may not be connected 
to  one  another and mayor may not change from moment to mo-
ment.  For this  alternative  mode  (or modes)  of  political  analysis 
there is  no single grand site of politics, no single, grand intersection 
of objectives. 
3.  De/ining  and  Redefining Left Politics  in  Australia 
A term  like  'Left politics  in Australia' is  very  difficult  to define. 
There  is  no  single  organization  or  activity  to  which  it can be 
simply  equated.  To the best of  my  knowledge  there is  no entry 
in  any  Australian  telephone  directory  under  the  heading  Left 
Politics.  Hrtving  regard to these limitations,  the best definition  I 
can  offer  is:  groupings  of  definite  and  commonly-held  political 
objectives  such  as  revealing  and  overcoming  oppression  and re-
vealing  and  overcoming  exploitation  and  the  forces  which  are 
trying  to  achieve  them in Australia. 
What  is  important  about this  definition for us  here is  not the 
underlying  objectives  and the possibility of  achieving  them,  it is 
the operation of these objectives as  unifiers, the fact that they are 
thought  and  said  to  be  COl1unOl1.  It is  this  commonality  which 
forces  the groupings of definite political objectives and their forces; 
without it there would be no groupings. To complete my definition 
of  Left  politics  in  Australia I  need to  point to the mechanisms 
through which the thinking and saying of commonality operate-
such  thinking  and  saying  obviously  does  not  just  get  done  by 
individuals  in  a  vacuum.  These  mechanisms  are  quite  specific 
and  spedfiable.  They  include:  certain  journals  (such  as  Arena, 
Intervention,  and  Thesis Eleven); certain publishing ventures and 
their  products  (Kibble  Books,  Local Consumption  Publications, 
etc.); certain newspapers  (Tribune, etc.); certain political groups 
and factions;  certain discussion groups;  and certain university and 
college  departments,  parts  of  departments  and  courses.  In other 
words  Left politics  in Australia is  a  device  or series  of  devices 
used  by  certain  organizations  to think  and say  commonality be-
tween  different  political  objectives  and their forces. 
I  should  stress  that my  definition of  Left politics  in Australia 
is  not offered by way of denigration of these mechanisms. I  write 
from  the position that specific attempts to  achieve definite political 
Arena  78,  1987  155 objectives  are  all  that  political  theory  can  reasonably  address. is 
As such I  offer nly definition by way of careful assessment of the 
possibility  of  achieving  at  least  some  of  the  objectives  grouped 
under the term.  I will discuss  the mechanisms in this  spirit. 
For the alternative mode of  political analysis  I  am suggesting, 
any grouping of definite objectives is useful and worth encouraging 
if it helps achieve one or more of the objectives involved without 
restricting the possibility of any other one of them being achieved. 
On the  other hand any  grouping  should be discouraged if it re-
stricts  the  achievement  of  any of these  objectives.  This  latter,  I 
suggest, will always  occur where the mechanism doing the group-
ing imposes  a meta-objective  (like winning the class  struggle)  on 
the  objectives  involved19  or  imposes  anyone  or  more  of  the 
objectives on any of the others. 
Any mechanism of Left politics  in Australia needs  to be very 
carefully  organized if it is  to  avoid  this  weakness.  The CPA or 
the  ALP or Arena or certain femwst groups  may  well  discuss 
objectives  concerned with  child-care centres,  prison  reforms  and 
the Accord as  'Left' objeotives  and/or 'socialist' objectives.  They 
may well be able to see Left or socialist connections between them 
and on the basis  of  this  to draw up  and act  on  policies  which 
enhance  the prospects  of achieving  all  of them. If they do  there 
is  obviously no problem.  Indeed, such aggregations  are to  be en-
couraged.  But if anyone of these  particular mechanisms  sees  a 
Left or socialist connection between these objectives  on the basis 
of some meta-objective,  like socializing the means  of production, 
and  then draws  up  and  acts  on policies  which  privileges  one  of 
these objectives  at the  expense  of one of  the  others,  say  the ob-
jeotive concerned with the Accord at e:e expense of the objective 
concerned with child-care centres,  then  this  mechanism is  clearly 
in need of re-organization. 
18.  In this I very much agree with Foucault's position. As Martin (op. cit., 
p. 141,  n. 12)  puts it,  quoting bibliographer Michael Clark:  'Foucault 
defends  himself  against  [Sartre's]  demand  for  political  engagement 
(as opposed to theoretical contemplation); that demand ...  he  opposes 
by  trying  to  bring  theoretical  work  and  political  action  closer  to-
gether.' 
19.  An example of this tendency  can be  found in Doug White's  editorial 
in Arena 74,  1986, where  he says that at the Broad Left Conference 
in Sydney the expression of objectives - specifically about US nuclear 
arms  policy  in  the  Pacific  and  Aboriginal  land  rights - was  'not 
formulated  within  a  Left perspective.  These  objectives  are  no  longer 
situated in  a  context of anti-imperialist  struggle  or a  struggle  for  the 
rights  and  determinations  of  small  nations  and  peoples',  pp. 5-6. 
Specific  objectives  are  marginalized in  favour  of meta-objectives. 
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di\'crsity of  objectives in  their own right.  This may mean ohanging 
internal  decision-making  procedures.  Some  mechanisms  have  al-
ready  begun  to  do so.  Arena is  clearly heading in  this  direction, 
as  is  the  CPA,  as  Connell points  out: 
[C]ommunist  parties  would  have  liked  to  establish  control  over  other 
'social  movements'. The plain fact is  that they failed.  The more intelli-
gent communist parties  (e.g. the  CPA)  have  given up the  attempt and 
are  trying  to live with diversity,ZO 
Perhaps  wbat  is  needed  in  the case of  the ALP is  not so much 
internal  organjzational  change  as  greater awareness  of its  possi-
bilities  by  the  forces  trying to achieve specific objectives. 
So  the  alternative  mode of  political analysis  means that mech-
anisms  of  Left  politics  in  Australia,  those  organizations  which 
connect  different objectives,  cannot work with a universal, eternal 
agenda.  There is  no  longer  a  single  set of  priorities.  They must 
be  prepared to  accommodate many different agendas  if they are 
to be  helpful  to the different  objectives  they connect. 
As  for  these  different  objectives  themselves  and  the  forces 
involved  in  trying to  achieve them,  the  alternative  mode of poli-
tical  analysis  means  there is  no longer a need to justify activities 
in terms  of  any meta-objective or in terms of any other objective. 
To ,take  just one example,  consider the objective of penal reform 
in  New  South  'Vales.  This  objective,  as  David Brown shows in 
an  excellent  recent  paper,  is  best  achieved  by  concentrating  on 
the  specific  issues  which  effect  the operation of the penal system 
in  NSvV,  completely  free  of  the constraints  imposed by a  meta-
objective.  Brown  argues  that this  objective  needs  to address  the 
recent increase in prison populations, alttacks  on various executive 
fonns  of  release,  the  activities  of  the  NSW  Parole  Board,  the 
activities  of  some  sections  of the NSW  judiciary,  the role of  the 
media  and  access  to  the media in debates  about reform,  the role 
of certain  conservative commentators  as  'experts', the role of the 
NSW  Opposition,  the  current weakness  of  and internal  divisions 
within  reform groups,  the  neu~ralization of  internal prisoner pro-
test  activity,  the role of the NSW ALP, and the role of the NSW 
Government  (not necessarily the same), among  other issues.  He 
explicity  rejects  meta-objeotives  to  do  with  individuals  and blue-
prints.21 
20.  Connell,  op.  cit.,  p.  82. 
21.  David  Brown,  'Preconditions  for  Sentencing  and  Penal  Reform  in 
NSW:  Some  Suggestions  Towards  a  Strategy  for  Contesting  an 
Emerging  Law  and  Order Climate',  unpublished  paper,  University  of 
NSW,  1986. 
Arena  78,  1987  157 
I 
I 
I For specific  objectives  and their forces  in Australia the mech-
anisms  of  Left politics,  the  mechanisms  of  connection,  have  no 
necessary  or  automwtic  function.  They,  or  at  least  anyone of 
them,  mayor not be useful  for  any  particular objective  and  its 
forces,  its  subjects.  The forces  involved in objectives  about  the 
Accord  or the  deregistration  of  the BLF for instance  are likely 
to  see  much  more  value  in  aotivities  within  the  ALP  than  are 
those  involved  in objectives  about  the  role  of women in  senior 
academic  positions  or  the training  of  medical  pratctitioners,  al-
though  in  all  cases  the forces  may  see  value  in  activities  within 
Arena. 
This  diversity  and  unevenness  should  neither  be  condemned 
nor celebrated.  Specific  objectives  and the  possibility  of  achiev-
ing  them,  including  the  possibility  of  achieving  some  of  them 
by connecting  them,  should be the focus  of  political  theory  and 
debate,  not the patterns of  any  connections. 
Two  potential  objections  to  the  alternative  mode  of  political 
analysis  have to be briefly  countered before I  conclude. The first 
is  reformism.  This  charge  only has  relevance  if  we  maintain the 
meta-objective  of  revolution  and  hence  the  revolution/reform 
dichotomy.  I  have  argued  against  the involvement  of  any  meta-
objective,  so  I  see  no relevance  to  this  charge.  Of course  those 
dramatic shifts  or potential shifts in governmental,  economic  and 
industrial arrangements which are sometimes  referred  to  as  revo-
lutions  may  well  be  analysed,  but  as  specific  objectives,  not  as 
meta-objectives.  The  second  potential  objection  is  empiricism. 
This  charge  is  also  irrelevan1:.  It relies  on  a  meta-objective  in 
political theory to do with the operation of an independent reality 
(all forms  of  empiricism  share  this  objective,  albeit  not in the 
same way  or to the same degree).  I  have already  made  it clear 
thart  this  objective  does  not have a place in the  alternative mode 
of analysis for which I  am arguing.  This type of political analysis 
is  not informed by an epistemological distinction  between theory 
and reality.  Rather it is  informed by an explicit rejection  of  any 
such  distinction  in  favour  of  specific  considerations  of  different 
objectives in different places.  Tactical assessments  which  have no 
necessary connection with one another take the place of  a unified 
epistemological  project. 
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If  political  analysis  is  about  taotical  assessments  which  are  not 
necessarily  connected,  there is  no sense in which political analysis 
can be a single knowledge enterprise which connects them. Indeed, 
as  I suggested  earlier,  even  the status  of  political  analysis  as  an 
'it'  is  problematic.  This  means  thart:  this  essay cannot have a uni-
fying,  universal  status. Theoretical essays, like theoretical journals, 
have  definite  effects  only  in  certain  specific  places  where  they 
operate,  where they  are  read and used. It is important to remem-
ber  that  an  essay,  like  any writing,  cannot be a universal unifier, 
no  maltter  how  widely  it is  read and used and  110  matter whose 
name  is  attached  to  it.22 
22.  Having  said  that  I  would  like  to  acknowledge  the  influence  on  this 
essay  of some other work which has not been acknowledged elsewhere 
in  the essay, particularly the work of Barry Hindess, and the work of 
Ernesto  Lac1au  and  .  Chantalle  Mouffe  (Hegemony  and  Socialist 
Strategy,  London,  Verso,  1985).  Their  work,  like  Foucault's  has 
helped  enormously  in  formulating  the  alternative  mode  of  political 
analysis  discussed,  though  of  course  the  alternative  discussed  is  not 
the  same  as  any  of those  used in this work. 
SPECIAL  DOUBLE  ISSUE 
5 
In  July  1985,  over  13,000  women  gathered  in  Nairobi, 
Kenya  to  evaluate  the  past  ten  years  and  plan  for  the 
future.  To  document this event,  Connexions  has  put to-
gether a special issue - 64 pages of interviews, analysis, 
workshop  reports  and  photos. 
This special  issue  is  now available at $6  a copy (postage 
paid)  from  Connexions-AR,  4228  Telegraph  Avenue, 
Oakland  CA 94609,  USA. 
Please  send  international  money  orders  in  US$ 
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